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Abstract: During Hurricane Katrina a group of faculty, staff, and students at Louisiana 
State University voluntarily helped create, manage, and staff Geographic Information 
System (GIS) efforts in the Louisiana Emergency Operations Center (EOC). GIS is an 
integral component to decision support in all phases of emergency operations (Curtis et 
al 2006; Eichenbaum 2002; Gunes and Kovel 2000; Johnson and Uba 1997; Kaiser et 
al 2003; Kehrlein and Shreve 1995; Maniruzzaman et al 2001; Morrow 1999; Newsom 
and Matrani 1993; Pine 1997; Thomas et al 2002). However, for the Katrina response, 
no Louisiana state employees were assigned to the GIS desk at the EOC. This failure to 
have an established support system for all other agencies providing response could 
have been a devastating fault without the volunteer support provided by LSU. Most 
agencies looked for us in the EOC and then relied upon us throughout the operation. 
This paper documents the way our group utilized our academic backgrounds to expand 
and improve the geospatial decision support in the EOC. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Even the most prepared Emergency Operation Center (EOC) is 
unlikely to have all the equipment, data, and skilled personnel to 
provide adequate geospatial decision support for response operations 
in the face of a disaster at the scale of Hurricane Katrina (Curtis et al 
2006). Although the likelihood of the same type of disaster affecting 
other areas in the United States is obviously geographically limited, 
the forced evacuations of late August and early September in 2005 
could be replicated elsewhere by a major terrorist attack. In order to 
provide adequate geospatial decision support for the massive response 
operation coordinated through the Louisiana EOC, various academic 
units from Louisiana State University (LSU) joined together to provide 
the infrastructure and expertise needed to cope with the disaster. This 
situation was exacerbated by a series of political events leading to no 
in-situ GIS presence in the EOC. This paper will describe the way in 
which our predominantly university based support group “grew” dayby- 
day both in terms of numbers and in operational effectiveness. The 
lessons learned will be presented as five central categories needed for 
geospatial decision support in an EOC. 
 
A commonly taught concept, often stressed by FEMA, in 
disaster courses is that the local community must be able to react 
to a catastrophe for at least 72 hours before federal intervention. 
Although this concept is usually discussed independent of event 
scale, the basic premise is that for any natural or human caused 
disaster the local community must be able to understand, react and 
respond to unfolding events for the first three days after the disaster 
(CERT 2006). At the end of this period efforts can be supplemented 
or even replaced by federal intervention. Data and experiences can 
be “passed on” to the incoming teams. 
 
For the majority of disasters this means that all response activities 
are coordinated and supported at the local level (CERT 2006). 
However, Hurricane Katrina showed that for a major catastrophe, the 
response period can extend into weeks after the initial impact. After 
the actual hurricane had made landfall, secondary events including 
levee breaks, flooding, looting, fires, shelter evacuation and finally 
city-wide evacuation meant that disaster response lasted for at least 
three weeks. During this time, the geospatial decision support team, 
coalesced from a variety of departments, computer labs and research 
units at LSU, continued to provide the majority mapping support to 
the EOC. The clientele had expanded from local rescue units to an 
assortment of teams from other states and federal agencies. Most 
of these groups accepted the volunteer round-the-clock presence as 
being a key support mechanism in the EOC. Indeed, it is likely that 
many units never knew the “GIS desk,” as it was called, comprised 
mainly of volunteers. 
 
Unlike most other state EOCs, no existing geospatial decision 
support was present for Louisiana. This has resulted in a series of 
events and observations that will prove useful for major catastrophe 
planning in other states. The lack of an existing spatial support 
presence meant that there was little in the way of territoriality and 
adherence to set support practices. Although the response was not as 
efficient as it could have been due to the lack of such a set structure, 
this flexibility also allowed for a response system to evolve as needed. 
This evolution can now be used to provide insight and improvements 
in other existing EOC response strategies. Two incontrovertible 
facts have emerged from the response to Hurricane Katrina. First, 
no state EOC can provide total support for a catastrophe such as 
Hurricane Katrina, and therefore a flexible structure needs to be able 
to incorporate additional equipment, data and personnel as and when 
needed. A partnership with academia provides an obvious solution 
to this problem. Second, the response team and response strategy 
must be flexible as events will occur beyond existing preparedness 
strategies. It is therefore important to have spatial thinkers as well as 
spatial technicians as part of the response team. Again, a partnership 
with academia can easily fill that role. 
 
 
Geospatial Decision Support in the EOC 
 
An important part of the response to a major catastrophe is what 
could be called the creation of a “spatial knowledge hub”. The map 
is a vital tool for any coordinator or planner in the EOC, or responder 
in the field (Curtis et al. 2006; Eichenbaum 2002). The map plays 
many roles during the initial response; it can be used to identify 
route ways into and out of the affected area, it can help responders 
navigate into those areas, it can be used to plot the location of 911 
calls, it can show where the deepest flooding is occurring, which 
roads are impassable and where clinics can be found. Obviously, 
the role of the map will change depending on the scale and type of 
disaster. For a tornado touchdown, requests for spatial information 
might be limited to a relatively small geographic area. For an event 
covering a larger geographic area, such as forest fire, the type of 
spatial request might be limited to events surrounding the actual 
hazard itself (pathways into the fire-affected area, properties likely 
to be affected, etc.). In a major regional catastrophe that results in 
mass evacuation, for example as in the case of Hurricane Katrina, 
requests can be incredibly varied and cover a large geographic area. 
Typical requests include making maps of flooded areas, generating 
road maps around levee breaks, 9-1-1 call locations, looter activity 
hotspots, clinic locations, and the location of state lands for temporary 
shelter locations (Figure 1). The role of the “GIS desk” in the EOC 
is to create these maps, in addition to providing any other spatial 
information such as coordinate locations as quickly and effectively 
as possible. 
 
A geographic information system (GIS) is often the spatial 
technology used to create these maps. Simply put, the GIS is a spatial 
database that allows for multiple spatial datasets, ranging from street 
addresses to satellite imagery of flooded areas, to be combined in 
a single display. In this way, if an agency wanted to know where 
all 9-1-1 call locations were in one neighborhood, and whether that 
neighborhood had experienced any looter activity, and which roads 
leading into the neighborhood were flooded, the GIS could be used 
to combine these data layers using a common coordinate scheme. 
The answer to the request, or “product” as it was termed in the 
Louisiana EOC, would usually be one of three types. 
 
Figure 1: Sample of Typical Geospatial Data Requests During Hurricane Katrina 
 
 
 
 
 
First, large format (poster size) plots would allow the map to 
be viewed by a large group of responders or to a select group of 
decision makers. As a typical example of where these maps would 
be used, LSU graduate students working in the EOC would often be 
asked for daily update “posters” to be produced before 7:00 am to 
help brief visiting political figures, and be used in the early morning 
media update. Second, and in a similar vein, maps can be directly 
displayed from the PC, usually via a projection system onto the EOC 
wall, again as a tool to aid decision-making. Within the Louisiana 
EOC these images were continually projected along one wall. They 
could include news updates, the location of other weather systems 
across Louisiana, or the maps created by the EOC “GIS desk.” The 
flooded area overlay on a Google Earth 3-D image of New Orleans 
was a particular favorite within the EOC (Figure 2). Third, maps can 
be made for the response teams to take into the field. For example, 
a mini-atlas was designed and printed showing flooded areas on 
all city streets. This consisted of a citywide index with different 
city sections numbered on a grid. Each grid section would also be 
printed as an enlarged version. Each sheet was usually no more than 
legal size allowing for portability (Figure 3). In an ideal world this 
information could be passed on digitally to an onboard GIS/GPS 
unit within the response vehicle. However, in the event of a major 
catastrophe, the likelihood of all vehicles having this technology 
is unlikely. If no additional disaster related information, such as 
flooded areas, is needed, traditional printed PDF versions of city 
maps, or traditional city maps available in any bookstore or gas 
station, provide the best navigation tools. 
 
A fourth type of spatial information request would not result in 
a map, but rather the locations would be extracted from a spatial 
source and relayed to the response team either verbally or as text. 
A typical example would be the extraction of coordinates from 
street addresses (9-1-1 calls) or coordinates from georegistered 
aerial photography displaying important building locations. During 
Hurricane Katrina, for example, a helicopter pilot would ask for 
coordinates of a series of clinics so a Public Health Service team 
could plan their assessment route. 
 
Figure 2: Flooded Area Overlay on a Google Earth 3-D Image of New Orleans 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Mini-Atlas of Roads 
 
 
 
For a catastrophe the size of Hurricane Katrina, the equipment, 
data and skilled expertise needed to create these cartographic 
products is likely to exceed traditional EOC resources. Requests 
for up to five posters would be made every hour at the height of 
the response; projecting maps on the EOC wall would tie-up one 
of the two computers running the GIS, each mini-atlas would 
require considerable time in initial design, and then further time 
in submitting print jobs, and finally the extraction of coordinates 
was labor intensive and time consuming. In addition, many of these 
tasks could not be completed if a background team didn’t exist that 
could find the required data, could manipulate data, could process 
imagery and provide an overseer’s eye on the entire process. The 
traditional structures of academic units mirror this required structure, 
with graduate students (and even undergraduates) providing the 
workforce, lab technicians and researchers providing the highlevel 
data collection and manipulation decisions, and research lab 
directors piecing together an evolving support structure that would 
encompass multiple units and locations. 
 
As previously mentioned, the two aspects that would overwhelm 
the capabilities of any EOC facing a regional catastrophe would be 
the need for greater resources and the flexibility to evolve as the 
catastrophe unfurled. In order to fully examine these points and at the 
same time show how effective an academic liaison can be, geospatial 
response can be broken into five sub-categories: equipment, data, 
personnel, management system, and the “X” factor. 
Equipment 
 
Equipment needs are relatively simple for an efficient EOC spatial 
knowledge hub. At least three fast PCs, loaded with relevant software 
(multiple GIS packages, a drawing package, and Google Earth 
being the most important), and a fast, secure (and reliable) Ethernet 
connection. A dedicated fast color laser printer (for A4 and legal size 
prints) and a large format plotter are also needed. The plotter would 
be used for posters, while the smaller color printer would be used to 
create the mini-atlases and other maps for the response teams. These 
are the minimum requirements. The LSU team quickly realized that 
more was needed for an event on the scale of Katrina. 
 
As an example of how this equipment was utilized in the EOC, 
one PC would be permanently running Google Earth allowing for 
coordinate relay to response teams, one PC would be sending printjobs 
to either the printer or plotter, and the third PC would be used 
to perform GIS operations and create maps. However, if a map 
was projected on one of the EOC screens, then that PC would be 
temporarily lost. 
 
During Hurricane Katrina it became immediately obvious that 
this equipment set-up was painfully inadequate. First, and probably 
unique to the Louisiana situation, two PC’s dedicated for GIS work, 
and the plotter, were older and slowed down processing, especially 
when submitting print jobs. This situation led to various labs 
volunteering laptops and even a new plotter for our group to use 
in the EOC. However, even with faster equipment, the LSU team 
realized that most GIS processing should be farmed back to the 
computer labs at LSU where multiple machines and plotters were 
located. The EOC should act primarily as a request collection center, 
with only extremely time-sensitive GIS operations being performed 
there. This had the additional benefit of mitigating the high-stress 
environment for those stationed at the “GIS desk”. 
 
The university setting provides the perfect environment for 
such remote data processing and product fulfillment. Most major 
universities contain multiple computer labs, many running GIS, 
supported by a large university-wide computer support team. The 
computers and plotters found in these labs are also likely to be faster 
than most found in a traditional state EOC. 
 
The one caveat in using such a University based support system 
is that the EOC must have a good Ethernet connection allowing for 
a reliable and fast two-way flow of EOC requests to the supporting 
computer labs. The returning product would usually be in the form 
of a scalable PDF, which could be printed or displayed in one of 
the three previously described cartographic formats. Alternatively, 
many poster size maps were printed at the university and delivered 
by hand to the EOC. 
 
It also quickly became clear that in providing spatial support 
to a catastrophe of this size, a dedicated server is needed. All 
products and data collected need to be stored in a central accessible 
site allowing multiple user access. A system is needed whereby 
the many labs producing data can upload, through a secure VPN 
connection, allowing other computer labs to access data and fulfill 
the cartographic requests. In addition, select non-university groups 
could also benefit from the data warehouse contained on the server 
through the same VPN connection. Although in a small disaster this 
server should be found at the EOC, for a major catastrophe, where 
multiple computer labs are in operation, a centralized server with 
adequate storage and maintenance capabilities is needed. Again, a 
university is well equipped for such a task. Not every university 
contains a super computer cluster such as LSU, though all have to 
work with a backbone usually connecting multiple research labs. 
 
 
Data 
 
A further benefit of involving a university as part of the EOC 
response team is that systems can be developed with one eye on 
research opportunities. Obviously, the primary concern in developing 
a geospatial response support system is making the system efficient 
and effective for the immediate task of saving lives. However, in 
developing this support, the LSU team learned that much of the data 
created during other disasters had been perishable, which in turn 
severely limited post-event research. Archived data and the resulting 
research can improve mitigation and future response strategies. 
With this thought in mind, the data warehouse implemented for 
the initial response began to evolve with the goal of preserving all 
data collected, including an extensive arsenal of aerial and satellite 
images. New data accessing software was developed with the help 
of the Intergraph Corporation allowing for users to browse these 
data sets by geographic area. Data can now be accessed in a spatially 
registered form irrespective of whether the user is running a GIS or 
not. This tool was not developed in time to be used for the response 
itself, but the seeds were sown during this time, and the data being 
created, the personnel creating it, the location of where these data were 
created, and the fact that the overseers of the system were academics, 
all contributed to its creation. It is unlikely whether a purely EOC 
based response would have resulted in the same outcome. 
 
With a fully operational support-computer lab at the university, 
the types of requests performed at the EOC itself should be limited 
to finding coordinates and printing. Although one would think that a 
GIS should be heavily involved at the EOC, most response requests 
do not actually need the analysis capabilities of such a system. During 
the initial response to Hurricane Katrina, search and rescue teams 
were flown in from every corner of the United States. These drivers 
had no knowledge of local roads. Although an initial response was to 
create street files in the GIS, it was soon realized that PDF versions 
of city maps exist, and these were all that was needed. In fact, many 
requests can be fulfilled using Internet sites. For example, a typical 
request during the response was to find coordinates for helicopter 
rescue teams. By using Google Earth the helicopter pilot could be 
given the coordinate of a clinic, and at the same time view the high 
resolution aerial photograph showing potential landing sites. Flood 
imagery could also be overlaid within Google Earth, allowing for 
New Orleans city officials to identify if storage facilities containing 
hazardous chemicals were under water, and again where to set 
down a helicopter. A graduate student began an on-going dialogue 
with Google Earth resulting in the manipulation of flood data being 
translated into overlay files (.kml files that work similar to .shp files) 
that could be used on any computer running Google Earth. It should 
be remembered that this GIS to Google Earth link, though common 
now, was in its infancy during the response. It was an academic 
mindset and tenacity that led to this implementation during this 
stressful period. The success of using Google Earth soon spread. 
The Office of Public Health had its own GIS EOC, which, by the 
standards of the State EOC, was data poor. Once members of the 
LSU team had loaded the flood overlay for them in Google Earth, 
they too had a tool for directing ambulance search and rescues teams. 
Without university involvement it is unlikely that such a hugely 
beneficial development would have occurred. 
 
Although the use of Google Earth was a major advancement 
resulting from the response to Hurricane Katrina, it does not 
mean to say that it lessens the amount of GIS and Remote Sensing 
that was needed in order to fully support the EOC, and in order 
to perform any GIS operation, data are needed. These data needs 
fall into two major categories; the data you have and the data you 
don’t. Although this may seem somewhat of a glib statement, it 
is painfully true. There will always be some data sets that are not 
available and need creation/processing time. A good example is the 
daily processing of ICONOS and SPOT imagery which were made 
available immediately following Hurricane Katrina to identify those 
areas of the city under water. These images had to be processed, 
either to form a raster coverage or to be turned into a vector layer 
for overlay on city street maps. Other post-disaster data processing 
includes address matching, though this proved to be more efficiently 
farmed out to private vendors who already worked in close contact 
with university-based projects. In addition to these data sets, 
unfortunately, other data were not available that should have been 
permanently housed at the EOC, or at least on the server at the 
supporting university. Data that should be permanently available 
on the EOC computers includes standard city infrastructure data 
(street files, DOQQ, DLG, census data). In addition, pre-geocoded 
data layers of sensitive buildings, health units, and pre-determined 
evacuation shelters, should be available. These should also contain 
all relevant attribute information (how many beds, etc.). It is not 
enough to know of a dataset’s location, such as at www.Census.gov, 
but rather preprocessed and easily workable layers should be stored 
on the supporting server. The role of a good EOC support person 
would be to identify which data sets were important and collect 
them when not in disaster-response mode. It is likely, however, that 
oversights will occur (such as the lack of PDF street atlases), due to 
the fact that it is impossible to predict all data requests in a major 
catastrophe. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, digital files of levee 
locations, building footprints, and state owned land (for temporary 
shelter locations) would also have proved to be extremely useful as 
immediately accessible files. 
 
The advantage of involving the university in the spatial response 
is that many of these data layers not available at the EOC are likely 
to be found in an academic department or a research unit. Failing 
that, most state agencies have contacts within the university so the 
right name and telephone number can be quickly found. In addition, 
it is likely that members of the university team will also have a good 
idea as to whether the data exists or not. If data is unavailable, the 
university also contains a large army of skilled workers who can 
create data layers, for example through digitizing hard-copy maps. It 
is unlikely whether an EOC based team would be as efficient. As one 
example of how hard it is to work in isolation, the GIS EOC desk for 
the Office of Public Health was severely limited to data that already 
existed on their computers. Their GIS personnel did not have the 
time to search for other data or process data as they were stretched 
thin by providing maps and support for their own response teams. 
 
University data sources, such as LSU’s Atlas (www.atlas.lsu.edu) 
can provide much of the basic data, while a system for data sharing 
among agencies should be in effect for providing more sensitive data. 
 
 
If we return to the three typical products mentioned at the beginning 
of this paper—posters, projections and hard copy atlases—all of 
these require considerable data availability and processing that is 
unlikely to ever be achieved in the EOC during a catastrophe. 
 
Finally, the size of the university team allows for more interesting 
data products to be developed. One example during Hurricane Katrina 
involved the processing of imagery needed to fly an unmanned probe 
across New Orleans. The comment made by the unit flying the probe 
was that it was easier to gain appropriate imagery in Iraq than it was 
for New Orleans. Although the initial contact was made at the EOC 
spatial support desk, it was a graduate student working by himself 
who eventually satisfied their request. 
 
 
Personnel 
 
During the height of the spatial support to the response, the 
preferred team size working the EOC desk was three, with an 
occasional overseer watching proceedings. In general one individual 
would provide coordinate support, one would take requests and one 
would perform GIS operations and submit print jobs. 
 
During a catastrophe extending over two to three weeks and 
working on our internally-defined basis that seven hours of highly 
stressful operation support was the maximum that anyone should 
work in any 24 hour period (though faculty, staff, and students 
regularly exceeded this limit in order to fulfill requests), we 
determined that for our operation to be effective in the EOC we 
would require at least nine members, plus overseers. Unfortunately, 
and as discussed previously, this is if a fully functional support 
operation was backing the EOC desk providing the majority of data 
development, GIS operations and cartographic design and printing. 
Although no exact figures exist, the number of graduate students, 
research associates, technical support staff and faculty involved at 
LSU and working with the EOC desk easily exceeded forty. The 
number of agencies and organizations asking for support, both of 
in-state and out-of-state origin also exceeded forty. 
 
The university is one of only a few environments where such a 
large number of skilled people can be mobilized, and as importantly, 
controlled under an existing administrative system. Even if multiple 
academic units are working together, these still respect a hierarchy 
that can, if necessary, be used to mandate operational procedures. The 
gathering of such a large volunteer force from multiple government 
 
agencies and private companies would likely suffer because of this 
lack of command as competitors vie for control. 
 
 
Developing a Management System 
 
During most disasters a small EOC team trained in geospatial 
technologies will probably suffice. However, as mentioned at the 
beginning of this paper, a catastrophe will swamp both existing 
infrastructure and response protocols. University personnel are often 
flexible in terms of modifying research approaches. This flexibility 
is partly a result of viewing with a critical eye and seeking to make 
improvement. It is unlikely that any EOC spatial support approach 
would be sufficient when dealing with a catastrophe. For example, 
during the first few days of the disaster all requests at the EOC desk 
involved a paper filing system. Unfortunately, this system was at 
best impossible to search for previously developed products, and at 
worst, was completely ignored. The danger was for duplication to 
occur. This situation was exacerbated by having no common labeling 
system and centralized filing location. The team working at 11:00am 
in a considerably stressful environment would not be aware of the 
maps produced at 5:00am for daily mission planning. The first step 
to reducing this inefficiency was to create the data warehouse at 
LSU that allowed for the products to be stored in a central location 
with universal access and not solely on a single computer at the 
EOC. Second, a common filing convention was developed with the 
input of the LSU map librarian. Third, an electronic tracking system 
allowed for requests to be taken, sent to the correct individual at the 
support lab at LSU, reminders generated, and finished products date- 
stamped. Although any future catastrophe occurring in Louisiana 
would benefit from this tracking system, as does the current expansive 
recovery operation, the seeds for its development germinated through 
university-based brainstorming sessions. It is unlikely a purely EOC 
based operation would have been as successful. 
 
 
The X factor 
 
Inside the EOC everything happens quickly, with requests being 
shouted amidst the general activity of the overall response operation. 
It has previously been stated that the minimum number of personnel 
needed for response was nine, plus overseers. It is not enough to simply 
count any nine skilled GIS workers, however, as it takes a certain 
temperament to work through the night, to be ordered by high ranking 
military officials to perform tasks, to be bombarded simultaneously 
with multiple tasks, to have computers and printers break, and to 
be exposed to the daily EOC updates telling of the devastation 
unfolding in your own backyard. In addition, graduate students would 
occasionally, and by mistake, have members of the public channeled 
to them as they searched for loved ones. These emotional telephone 
calls understandably had similarly emotional effects on the graduate 
students. It is therefore important to have a large enough pool of 
workers to allow for some fluctuation in personnel as no training 
can adequately prepare for the stresses of a catastrophe. Again the 
university environment contains such a size pool. 
 
These stresses also occur from the living environment, including 
(in the case of Hurricane Katrina), no power in the home resulting 
in no air-conditioning, bumper-to-bumper traffic dramatically 
increasing driving time, shortages of essentials in the stores, and 
having to house displaced friends and relatives. In addition, members 
of the EOC team may be impaired by having direct contact with the 
catastrophe-effected region, either losing property or loved ones. 
During the initial response some members of the LSU team had to 
work while not hearing from loved ones, while others from New 
Orleans simply disappeared. The point to be gleaned from this “X” 
factor is that a large support system is needed to cope with all these 
staffing uncertainties (Curtis et al 2006; Eichenbaum 2002). 
 
The stress of the EOC also does not provide the ideal situation 
for effective decision-making, nor for an appreciation of the larger 
picture. A common finding during Hurricane Katrina was that 
everyone wanted to help, to “get-their-hands-dirty”, to be saviors. 
A more distanced objective outlook can provide necessary system 
adjustments which are lost on those in the EOC. The relative calm of 
the university allows for such objective decision making behavior. 
Although no one wanted to upset those who were working at the 
EOC, it became apparent that some of the decisions made, sometimes 
by individuals working for stretches of twenty-four hours at a time, 
were not effective. This experience is likely to be found in other 
EOCs where traditional staff are overwhelmed with the sheer size 
of a catastrophe. Although there is always the worry of territoriality, 
an ideal situation would have an overseer at the EOC reporting back 
to a decision making team of experienced faculty and staff housed 
at the University. 
 
 
The EOC University Partnership 
 
This paper has shown, using Hurricane Katrina as an example, that 
a state EOC is likely to be unprepared to cope with all geospatial data 
requests generated during a regional catastrophe. A major university 
offers the equipment, infrastructure, expertise, and staffing needed 
to cope with even the largest disaster. It therefore makes sense that 
these partnerships are solidified before a disaster occurs. Although 
the LSU “GIS desk” at the EOC was superb, indeed many agencies 
commented on how it was the best they had ever received during 
a disaster, the group was still thrust into the situation with little 
preparation. Many of those involved had never read any disaster 
related papers or working papers. It would have been useful to know 
of some of the same issues and solutions faced by those working 
in the aftermath of September 11th as they are transferable. It is 
therefore important to involve the university team as part of the EOC 
response effort, with regular briefings and brainstorming sessions 
scheduled to keep the larger team as prepared as possible. 
 
In addition, there is discussion at LSU that the university will 
take a more active role in the running of the spatial support desk 
at the EOC. If this happens, all students taught in introductory GIS 
classes will be exposed to the types of tasks performed during an 
emergency so that a perpetual support group is always in place. 
 
It is, however, more than just the physical size and connectivity 
of the university environment that makes such a partnership with the 
EOC so valuable. The university provides a pool of creative minds 
that in times of trauma can see possibilities and improve any system. 
Certainly, the university resource cannot be employed effectively 
and efficiently without pre-existing emergency plans enacted by the 
institution. For example, as LSU only received minimal damage 
from Katrina, faculty, staff, and students were able to fully access the 
resources that supported the EOC operation, such as the CADGIS 
Research Lab. In addition, Chief Ricky Adams of the LSU police 
states that, “The university was fortunate to have an established 
relationship in place prior to Katrina and Rita between academics, 
students, faculty, staff, and key university emergency operations 
personnel. This helped the university address the crisis and meet the 
many needs placed on the university and its resources.” 
 
As a result of Hurricane Katrina the LSU team has created 
the first Red Cross disaster assessment GIS which can be used to 
validate existing damage models, and may result in a technological 
change in the way Red Cross damage assessment data are collected. 
A data warehouse and tracking system (LSU GIS Clearinghouse 
Cooperative) is now being discussed by FEMA as the template to 
be transferred to all other disasters. Data are now being stored to 
help improve the response to future disasters. All pet-rescue related 
data collected by Chameleon Beach at animal shelters are now being 
fed continuously to LSU for research purposes, and the ongoing 
development of spatial displays in Google Earth (and other newly 
emerging web-based technologies) will certainly prove to be an 
invaluable tool in future response efforts. These are only a few of 
the university led advancements emerging from Hurricane Katrina, 
all of which directly evolved out of LSU team members working in 
concert with the EOC. 
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